Effects of word-evoked object size on covert numerosity estimations by Magda L. Dumitru & Gitte H. Joergensen
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 03 July 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00876
Edited by:
Roberta Sellaro,
Leiden University, Netherlands
Reviewed by:
Anna M. Borghi,
University of Bologna and Institute
of Cognitive Sciences and
Technologies, Italy
Shai Gabay,
University of Haifa, Israel
*Correspondence:
Magda L. Dumitru,
Department of Cognitive Science,
Macquarie University, 16 University
Avenue, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
magda.dumitru@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 13 April 2015
Accepted: 13 June 2015
Published: 03 July 2015
Citation:
Dumitru ML and Joergensen GH
(2015) Effects of word-evoked object
size on covert numerosity estimations.
Front. Psychol. 6:876.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00876
Effects of word-evoked object size
on covert numerosity estimations
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of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
We investigated whether the size and number of objects mentioned in digit-word
expressions influenced participants’ performance in covert numerosity estimations
(i.e., property probability ratings). Participants read descriptions of big or small
animals standing in short, medium, and long rows (e.g., There are 8 elephants/ants
in a row) and subsequently estimated the probability that a health statement
about them was true (e.g., All elephants/ants are healthy). Statements about large
animals scored lower than statements about small animals, confirming classical
findings that humans perceive groups of large objects as being more numerous
than groups of small objects (Binet, 1890) and suggesting that object size effects
in covert numerosity estimations are particularly robust. Also, statements about
longer rows scored lower than statements about shorter rows (cf. Sears, 1983)
but no interaction between factors obtained, suggesting that quantity information
is not fully retrieved in digit—word expressions or that their values are processed
separately.
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Introduction
People usually count concrete objects and living things and would rather speak of “8 baskets” or
of “8 elephants” than simply of “8,” for instance. Despite their frequency, these complex numerical
expressions composed of a digit followed by a word referring to a concrete object have been
overlooked in current research on numerical cognition. The present study is the first to investigate
whether word representations impact digit values to yield combined numerosity estimations. We are
particularly interested in how robust these effects are as well as in whether the two magnitudes, for
digits and for words, have distinct or shared conceptual and cortical representations when processed
together.
Current behavioral and neural evidence suggests that numerical abilities are flexible and depend
on context, habit, and cortical development (e.g., Dehaene, 1992; Lipton and Spelke, 2003; Siegler
and Opfer, 2003; Cantlon et al., 2006). Moreover, numerical abilities are common across sensory
modalities (cf. Walsh, 2003) and generate interaction and interference effects with space, time,
size, and luminance (e.g., Pinel et al., 2004; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007; Conson et al., 2008).
Recent research investigating the common basis of numerical values and object size (i.e., Gabay
et al., 2013) has confirmed that size-congruency effects are distinct from response-initiation effects
triggered by the primary motor cortex (cf. Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007) and are truly conceptual
in nature. Gabay et al. (2013) used equally-sized images of small and large animals in a parity-
judgment task and reported that, in conditions where response conflict effects were controlled
for, images of small animals primed small numbers whereas images of large animals primed large
numbers.
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These findings led us to hypothesize that, when processing
complex numerical expressions such as “8 elephants” or “8
ants,” the size of the objects to which the nouns refer would
exert a certain influence on people’s combined numerosity
estimations that is, on their concluding that both expressions
refer to eight objects. So, for example, we expect that even
numerate adults might unduly estimate that rows of large
objects (e.g., 8 elephants) contain more members than rows of
small objects (e.g., 8 ants), whereby they would be tempted to
combine the two magnitude types, for digits and for objects.
Indeed, numerosity estimations of concrete objects vary with
object size such that groups of small objects are judged to
be less numerous than groups of large objects (cf. Binet,
1890). We therefore anticipate that merely mentioning a group
of objects would evoke their combined size, which in turn
would affect the overall numerosity estimations of digit-word
expressions.
Language instantly evokes object properties including object
size (Rubinsten and Henik, 2002; Setti et al., 2009; Sellaro et al.,
2015), as predicted by theories of embodied and grounded
cognition (Barsalou, 2008). These theories hold that people
evoke multimodal perceptual simulations during online language
processing based on their experience with concrete situations.
Therefore, since language expressions are grounded in situations
where people routinely use them, merely reading about an object
is likely to evoke a full array of related experiences that gives
instant access to associated perceptual and cognitive processes.
Furthermore, results from brain imaging studies indicate that
the same regions become active when objects are presented in
pictorial form orwhen they arementioned by language (e.g., Chao
et al., 1999; Just et al., 2010). Research has also found that the
retrieval of numbermagnitude is a spontaneous process similar to
automatic language processing (Paivio, 1971; Barsalou, 2008) such
that numbers are rapidly assigned approximate representations
prior to further refinement in specific cortical areas (e.g., Tzelgov
et al., 1992).
Among the studies devoted to investigating language-evoked
object size, we recall the evidence reported in Rubinsten and
Henik (2002), who used a Stroop-like paradigm to show that,
in physical-comparison tasks (i.e., estimating which font size is
larger) as well as in conceptual-comparison tasks (i.e., estimating
which real-life animal is larger), judgments were faster for
congruent animal names (e.g., “lion” written in large font or
“ant” written in small font) than for incongruent names (e.g.,
“lion” written in small font or “ant” written in large font).
Similar evidence was provided by Setti et al. (2009) who used an
indirect task (i.e., category decision) asking participants to decide
whether two objects evoked by a prime word and by a target
word belonged to the same category. People responded faster
to targets following same-size primes (e.g., “elephant” following
“giraffe”) than to targets following different-size primes (e.g.,
“hare” following “giraffe”).
In our study, we used an indirect task (i.e., property probability
ratings) to explore the hypothesis that object size affects
numerosity estimations in digit-word expressions. We relied on
a well-established finding that people tend to evaluate single
entities more positively than groups (i.e., the “person-positivity
bias hypothesis” cf. Sears, 1983), which results in lower probability
ratings for a particular property as groups grow larger. For
example, when participants are presented with the information
“There are 8 elephants in a row” or “There are 156 elephants in
a row” and subsequently rate the probability that the statement
“All elephants are healthy” is true, their scores should be lower
for the statement about 156 elephants than for the about 8
elephants. We further predict that participants will rate small
animals’ health higher than large animals’ health (e.g., “All ants
are healthy” following “There are 8 ants in a row” would score
higher than “All elephants are healthy” following “There are
8 elephants in a row”). In other words, adults might consider
rows composed of large animals as being more numerous than
rows composed of the same number of small animals and thus
think of animals in “long” rows as being less healthy than
animals in “short” rows. Object size effects may occur despite
people’s ability to instantly recover the representation of the
digit “8” in “8 ants” and “8 elephants,” for instance, because
they are also able to rapidly evoke the size of the animals
mentioned.
Our covert task (i.e., object-property probability ratings)
taps into the later stages of combined magnitude processing
hence obtaining significant effects of word-evoked object size
on numerosity estimations would indicate that object-size effects
are particularly robust. To further preclude confounds relating to
whether size affects digit magnitude in virtue of the form of the
statement rather than in virtue of the way that sentence fragments
combine (i.e., jointly or independently), we varied the quantifier
type to suggest aggregate (i.e., “All elephants are healthy”) as well
as discrete numerosities (i.e., “Each elephant is healthy”).
Materials and Methods
Subjects
Fifty-two native English speakers volunteered for an online study
in return for course credit.
Stimuli
Stimuli were 36 sentences of which half included small animals
(e.g., bats, mice, crabs) and half included large animals (e.g.,
tigers, bears, wolves), as determined from a previous rating study
summarized in Table 1. Average ratings were calculated based
on individual size ratings (N = 22) of 100 items from two
categories (animals and vegetables). Participants rated the size of
each item presented individually in a scale from “0” (“not very
big”) to “10” (“very big”). We then selected 36 items (i.e., names
of small and large animals) from the rating study such that large
animals received ratings at least twice as high as small animals
and were also matched for frequency and length. Each sentence
was followed by a statement about the health of the animals
mentioned, as explained below. We constructed two lists (Latin
square design) such that all participants saw each number once,
paired with a small animal in the first list and with a large animal
in the second list. In each list, half of the animals were small and
the other half were large. Numbers ran from 3 to 8 in short rows,
from 43 and 95 in medium rows, and from 1269 to 8421 in long
rows. Both the numerosity study and the preliminary rating study
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TABLE 1 | Animal names in all stimuli statements used in the experimental studya.
Big Animals Small Animals
Length Frequency Size Length Frequency Size
Bears 5 3.17 7.77 Bats 4 2.74 2.95
Bisons 6 1.04 7 Bees 4 2.39 0.91
Camels 6 2.14 7.45 Beetles 7 1.76 1.14
Chimpanzees 11 1.6 5.86 Crabs 5 2.27 2.95
Crocodiles 10 1.85 6.59 Crickets 8 1.97 1.14
Deer 4 2.39 6.45 Doves 5 2.12 3
Donkeys 7 2.21 6.36 Finches 7 1.8 2.45
Foxes 5 2.61 4.59 Flies 5 3.32 0.55
Giraffes 8 1.76 8.32 Goldfish 8 2 1.77
Goats 5 2.53 4.82 Hamsters 8 1.75 2.32
Gorillas 8 2.19 7.05 Magpies 7 1.11 2.77
Hippos 6 1.6 7.77 Mice 4 2.6 2.68
Horses 6 3.19 7.05 Pigeons 7 2.26 2.95
Panthers 8 1.67 6.68 Rats 4 2.97 2.73
Reindeer 8 1.93 6.77 Robins 6 2.44 2.45
Tigers 6 2.64 7.09 Sparrows 8 1.77 2.36
Wolves 6 2.57 5.82 Spiders 6 2.36 1.45
Zebras 6 1.77 6.45 Squirrels 9 2.22 3.23
Average Scores 6.72 2.16 6.66 Average Scores 6.22 2.21 2.21
a20 participants rated the size of 36 animals on a scale from 1 (“not very big”) to 10 (“very big”).
Names of big and small animals were matched in length and frequency.
were conducted in accordance with the ethics requirements of the
University of York and followed relevant regulatory standards.
Design and Procedure
The experiment followed a 2 (Size: Small vs. Large animals)  3
(Row-length: Short vs. Medium vs. Long) fully factorial design.
We also introduced “quantifier” as a between-subjects factor
such that half of the participants read statements containing the
quantifier all and the other half read statements containing the
quantifier each. On a typical trial, participants read a description
(e.g., There are 3 crocodiles in a row) followed by a statement (e.g.,
All crocodiles are healthy or Each crocodile is healthy), which they
rated on a scale from 0 (“not very likely”) to 10 (“very likely”), as
seen in Figure 1.
Results
Figure 2 summarizes the average likelihood scores across
conditions. A 2 (Size: Small vs. Large animal)  3 (Row-
length: Short vs. Medium vs. Long) ANOVA revealed a main
effect of size, F(1, 50) = 6.62, p = 0.013, !2p = 0.117, and
a main effect of row-length, F(2, 100) = 173.76, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.777, but no interaction between factors, F(2, 100) = 2.06,
p= 0.132, suggesting that group size as well as word-evoked object
size influence property-probability ratings and thereby covert
numerosity estimations.
We also calculated Cohen’s d for each row-length condition
separately and found a sizeable difference between the effect size
in the long-row condition and the effect size in the short- and
medium-row conditions, namely a value of 0.311 for long rows,
a value of 0.183 for short rows, a value of 0.123 for medium rows,
suggesting the existence of a qualitative distinction between small
and medium groups comprising at most tens of individuals on
the one hand, and very large groups comprising thousands of
individuals on the other hand.
Importantly, we found no effect of quantifier type, F(1,
50) = 0.189, p = 0.665, suggesting that magnitude estimations
were not dependent on whether the quantifiers accompanying
animal names prompted participants to view the groups (i.e., rows
of animals) as aggregates (i.e., the quantifier “all”) or as discrete
sums of individuals (i.e., the quantifier “each”).
Discussion
We provided evidence that word-evoked object size impacts
numerosity estimations in a covert task where participants rated
the probability that several objects (i.e., 8 elephants) mentioned
in a previous statement are healthy. We obtained a main effect of
object size such that participants rated health statements about
large animals lower than health statements about small animals,
thereby confirming previous findings that language evokes object
size, which in turn impacts number processing (Rubinsten and
Henik, 2002; Setti et al., 2009; Gabay et al., 2013; Sellaro et al.,
2015). Unsurprisingly (cf. Sears, 1983), we also obtained a main
effect of group size such that health statements about long rows of
animals scored lower than statements about medium rows, which
in turn scored lower than statements about short rows.
Interestingly, we observed no interaction between factors,
which might suggest that quantity information is not fully
retrieved in digit—word combinations or that digit and word
magnitudes are processed separately at some level. Indeed, current
evidence suggests that de-composition may occur for expressions
containing same-type magnitude values, in particular for two-
digit combinations (e.g., Nuerk et al., 2001) such that each digit is
processed separately. Unfortunately, a decomposition account of
same or differentmagnitude types runs counter previous evidence
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FIGURE 1 | Example stimulus in our study. In each trial, participants
read a description (e.g., There are 3 crocodiles in a row) followed by a
statement (e.g., All crocodiles are healthy), whose likelihood they rated
on a scale from 0 (not very likely) to 10 (very likely). In half of the trials,
the statement contained a different quantifier (e.g., Each crocodile is
healthy).
FIGURE 2 | Mean likelihood judgments and 95% CIs for
statements (e.g., All elephants are healthy) following descriptions
of short, medium, and long rows of animals (e.g., There are 8/
156/ 2600 elephants in a row). Rows of small animals were perceived
as less numerous than rows of large animals, hence higher scores
obtained for the former than for the latter.
(i.e., size congruency effects in reaction-time studies) supporting a
shared magnitude code across quantity dimensions. Nevertheless,
the predictions of the decomposition account and of the size-
congruency principle could be reconciled if we examined more
closely the particularities of our task and associated cognitive
processes.
Most notably, the effect of object size is robust but small
that is, numerical estimations of digit—word expressions are
largely determined by digit values, which are subsequently
modulated by the size of a single object rather than by the
combined size of a group whose cardinality matches the digit
value. In other words, the plural form on the noun in “8
ants” does nothing to influence overall numerosity estimations,
which suggests that language processing constraints might be
responsible for the lack of interaction between object number
and object size. In particular, linearity requires that items in a
string be processed one by one in the order in which they are
mentioned and is thus compatible with the so-called “anchoring
bias” (cf. Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which is a general-
cognitive tendency toward grounding upcoming information
into information already acquired. In digit-word expressions, the
information provided by digit representations serves to anchor
subsequent information provided by word representations, with
lasting effects. In particular, our covert numerosity task (i.e.,
property probability ratings) explored the late combination stages
of word-evoked object size and overall numerosity estimations
rather than early behavioral reactions in item-by-item processing,
as was the case in previous studies. The linearity constraint is
likely to be responsible for the incomplete retrieval of quantity
information. It is a matter for further research to confirm this
hypothesis as well as whether full magnitude retrieval might be
obtained for languages with a different word order, namely for
languages where digits follow object names.
Let us now briefly consider the score differences between
the short and medium row conditions on the one hand and
the large row condition on the other hand, which were rather
sizeable in the absence of a significant interaction between object
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number and object size. We believe that these findings too are
amenable to task properties, in particular to the stimuli used (i.e.,
digit magnitudes). Unlike previous studies where small numbers
ran from 1 to 10 and large numbers would not surpass 100,
our study included extremely large values (i.e., thousands) in
the long-row category, which people might find less familiar or
more difficult to grasp. The qualitative properties of very large
magnitudes are likely to result from the comprehension effort
they require, which might help explain why score differences
between small and large animals were greatest in effortful trials
(i.e., in the “long row” condition). By comparison, the tasks
used in previous behavioral andneuro–cognitive studies reporting
significant object size effects strongly evoked motor control and
were thus inherently effortful. Importantly, effortful processing
depends on participants’ goals hence specific cortical areas are
recruited for handling the response types required. These findings
suggest that the mapping between number magnitude and action
representation is rather flexible (Koch and Prinz, 2005; Koch
and Rumiati, 2006; Wenke and Frensch, 2005). Indeed, as shown
in Fias et al. (2001) and in Lammertyn et al. (2002), effects of
Spatial-Numerical Association Response Code (SNARC – e.g.,
Dehaene et al., 1993) were obtained only when participants
judged the orientation of a digit, but not when they judged the
color of the digit, arguably because the processing of numbers
as well as orientation relies on regions of the parietal cortex,
which belongs to the dorsal stream, while color processing relies
mainly on regions of the inferior temporal cortex, which belongs
to the ventral stream (Zeki et al., 1999). Since particular tasks
involve different magnitude representations in the ventral and
dorsal pathways, the extent of their neural overlap determines
the interaction between numbers and action as well as between
numbers and space (e.g., Badets et al., 2007).
In the present study, the object size effect as well as the
qualitative difference between small and medium groups on the
one hand and large groups on the other hand might stem from
a basic tendency toward translating different magnitude types
onto each other as well as from an instant appraisal of the effort
required for manipulating the objects, as predicted by theories
of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 2008), thus engaging specific
cortical pathways. It remains an issue for future research to
carefully determine the relevance of themanipulability hypothesis
(e.g., Moretto and Di Pellegrino, 2008; Badets and Pesenti, 2010,
2011; Ranzini et al., 2011) for the processing of digit-word
expressions by varying response type and/or object affordability
(e.g., manipulable vs. non-manipulable).
Numerate adults’ susceptibility to object-size biases also
remains to be investigated in future research. Whereas it is
widely acknowledged that the number sense is influenced by
maturation levels, which generate differences in cortical activity
between children and adults (Dehaene et al., 2003; Cantlon
et al., 2006; Hyde et al., 2010), the extent to which maturation
levels reflect expertise levels is largely unknown. The existence
of correlations between maturation and expertise levels might
help explain why children’s ability to discriminate numerosities
and their capacity to map numbers onto distinct numerosities are
not perfected before adolescence, once they have been exposed
to a full range of numerical information (e.g., Lipton and
Spelke, 2003). We believe that, in our study, adults’ numeracy
expertise has prevented them from unduly concluding that the
result of counting 8 elephants would be very different from
the result of counting 8 ants, thus yielding only small effects
of object size and no interaction between number and size.
In other words, though object size exerted only a limited
influence on adults’ numerosity estimations, it might have a
greater impact on children and adults who lack extensive expertise
with numerical calculations (e.g., tribal populations). The results
of our study suggest that words can readily evoke object
properties, which numerate adults factor in when making overt
property likelihood judgments and thereby covert numerosity
estimations.
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